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Crummey Delivers Another
Knockout Punch to the IRS
By Phyllis C. Taite
Mikel v. Commissioner1 involved property trans-
ferred to the IEM Family Trust (IEM trust) by Israel
and Erna Mikel (the petitioners) with Salomon
Mikel as trustee. Petitioners were trust beneficiaries
along with their children, lineal descendants, and
their respective spouses. On June 15, 2007, petition-
ers transferred $3,262,000 to the trust, and each
claimed $720,000 in annual exclusions.2 At that time
there were 60 beneficiaries, and many were under
18 years of age. The remaining $1,822,000 was
reported as taxable gifts.3
The trustee was empowered to make discretion-
ary distributions for the health, education, mainte-
nance, or support of any beneficiary or family
member. Any discretionary distributions made by
the trustee were ‘‘absolute and unreviewable’’ and
binding upon the beneficiaries and interested par-
ties. If any beneficiary chose to dispute the discre-
tionary distributions, that dispute was required to
be submitted to a beth din.4
Also, the trust contained an in terrorem provision
(also known as a no-contest clause).5 The in terrorem
provision stated that a beneficiary would cease to
be a beneficiary if he directly or indirectly insti-
tuted, opposed, or participated in a challenge to a
trust distribution or if he filed any action in a court
of law.
When the petitioners transferred the property to
the trust, they treated a portion as annual exclusion
gifts. After the commissioner (the respondent) con-
tacted them, the petitioners filed a gift tax return for
various assets and claimed $720,000 in annual ex-
clusion transfers for each of the trust’s 60 beneficia-
ries. The respondent sent petitioners separate
notices of deficiency, determining the petitioners
were ineligible for the annual exclusions. The re-
spondent contended the beneficiaries did not have
a present interest in the gifts.
The petitioners consolidated their cases, filed a
petition for partial summary judgment, and asked
the court to determine their eligibility to claim the
annual exclusion.6
The seminal case to determine whether beneficia-
ries have a present interest in trusts is Crummey v.
Commissioner.7 To satisfy the present interest test, a
beneficiary must have an unconditional right to
withdraw upon demand. Article V of the IEM trust
granted each beneficiary the right to withdraw trust
principal, including transferred property, in the
amount of the annual exclusion.8
1Mikel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-64.
2In 2007 the annual exclusion amount under section 2503(b)
was $12,000.
3Neither petitioner filed Form 709, ‘‘United States Gift (and
Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return,’’ in 2007 reporting
the transfers. In 2011 petitioners each reported $911,000 in
taxable gifts by filing Form 709. In 2007 the applicable exclusion
amount for gifts was $1 million; as a result, the petitioners did
not owe any tax on the transfers.
4A beth din is a Jewish court consisting of a three-person
panel. In this case the trust required the beth din to consist of
three members of the Orthodox Jewish faith. The panel was
directed to enforce the trust’s provisions.
5An in terrorem clause is generally designed to discourage
beneficiaries from challenging the trustees. There is no indica-
tion in the records whether any discretionary distributions were
made or whether any dispute had arisen.
6Mikel at *4, citing Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.
518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994). Under the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rule 121(b), a court may
grant summary judgment for cases in which there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact, and a decision may be rendered
as a matter of law.
7Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
8The amount subject to withdrawal was the lesser of a
formula-derived amount or the annual exclusion in effect dur-
ing the tax year of the transfer. At the time of the transfer, the
annual exclusion was the lesser amount.
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Within a reasonable time after contributions, the
IEM trust required the trustee to notify all benefi-
ciaries (and guardians of beneficiaries) of their right
to withdraw. Each beneficiary had to notify the
trustee, in writing, of his intent to withdraw. The
right to withdraw lapsed if not exercised within 30
days of the notice. On October 9, 2007, an attorney
for the trust mailed the required notices to each
beneficiary.9 The trustee properly notified each ben-
eficiary of his Crummey right to withdraw.
The respondent conceded that the trust language
had the requisite withdrawal rights but contended
the beneficiaries still did not have a present interest.
The respondent based its contention on the trust’s
in terrorem provision. The provision discouraged
beneficiaries from challenging discretionary acts of
the trustees and provided that any dispute must be
submitted to a beth din. Based on those two terms,
the respondent asserted a beneficiary might be
reluctant to go to court to exercise his rights.
In reaching its decision, the court compared this
case with Cristofani,10 in which the determination of
a present interest was based not on the likelihood
that a beneficiary would exercise his rights, but
rather whether the beneficiary had a legal right to
demand.11 Because the minor beneficiaries had a
legal right to demand and could legally withdraw
from the trust, the court concluded that there was a
present interest for the purpose of section 2503(b).
In 1992 the IRS published an action on decision
acquiescing only in the result of Cristofani.12 The IRS
indicated it would continue to challenge annual
exclusion rights that ‘‘indicate a greater abuse of the
Crummey power than those of Cristofani.’’13
In 1996 the IRS provided another action on
decision explaining its position, stating that the IRS
‘‘does not contest annual gift tax exclusions for
Crummey powers where the trust instrument gives
the power holders a bona fide unrestricted legal right
to demand immediate possession and enjoyment of
trust income or corpus.’’14 The IRS made it clear that
simply creating a withdrawal right would not be
enough. If the demand rights were illusory, the IRS
would challenge the annual exclusion.15
In Mikel, the respondent contended the with-
drawal right was illusory because an attempt to
legally enforce the right could lead to adverse
consequences. The court disagreed. Because the
beneficiaries had a right to a beth din, which was
directed to give the beneficiaries the same rights
they would be entitled to under state law, the court
concluded that the beneficiaries had sufficient en-
forcement power.
While the respondent conceded that the benefi-
ciaries had a remedy in state court, it claimed that
the right was illusory because of the in terrorem
provision. The court again disagreed, concluding
that the in terrorem provision was meant to discour-
age challenges to the trustee’s discretionary distri-
butions.
Because the trustee did not have discretion to
deny a timely made withdrawal demand, the in
terrorem provision did not apply to the demand
right. Thus, the right to judicially enforce it was not
illusory. Because the beneficiaries had an uncondi-
tional right to withdraw, they had present interest
in the trust. Accordingly, the court granted petition-
ers’ motion for partial summary judgment.
Analysis and Conclusion
The annual exclusion is a regular and integral
part of most estate plans for high-net-worth clients.
Because clients want to maximize tax-free distribu-
tions without giving up too much control, estate
planners are pushed to find creative ways to exploit
the Crummey powers.
In this case, it is clear the petitioners trusted their
trustee and wanted specific control over a benefi-
ciary’s right to oppose the trustee’s discretion. Cli-
ents often want to exert as much control over
beneficiaries as possible to facilitate a specific vision
they have for their property. This certainly could
have been accomplished without tying the lan-
guage to the Crummey rights.
In large part, the IRS challenged the provision
because the drafters did not make it clear that the in
terrorem provision did not apply to the right to
demand. Although inartfully drafted, Crummey
won again. Maybe it’s time for the IRS to ‘‘throw in
the towel’’ and concede because Crummey is too
formidable an opponent. That certainly encourages
estate planners to continue to be creative and push
the envelope.
However, the IRS has remained true to its word
in challenging any annual exclusion that threatens
the absolute right to withdraw. Maybe the lesson for
estate planners is to draft standard language re-
garding the demand right. It is unnecessary to get
creative; the boilerplate is enough. Understanding
that clients, at times, want extra guarantees that the
beneficiary will not withdraw the money, it seems
an unnecessary risk to tinker with something that
already works extremely well. In other words,
when drafting annual exclusion language, it’s best
to leave well enough alone.
9There is no indication in the records whether any benefi-
ciary had ever exercised his withdrawal rights.
10Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991).
11Id.
12CC-1992-009.
13Id.
14CC-1996-010.
15Id.
COMMENTARY / ESTATE AND GIFT RAP
840 TAX NOTES, November 9, 2015
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
(C) Tax Analysts 2015. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
